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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not specifically and thoroughly

examining the statutory factors of alimony found in Utah Code Section 30-3-5 and
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) regarding Loralie Kemp Rigbv's financial
needs, her ability to produce income for herself and the ability of Vernon Ray Rigby to
provide for her needs. Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1999). In
determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial court must
consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide
support; and the length of the marriage. (Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, 974, P.2d
306).
Standard of Review: Trial judges are given "some discretion" in determining
mixed questions of fact and law. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-40 (Utah 1994).
Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony... and will be upheld
on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Breinholt
v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995) quoting Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209
(Utah App. 1991). Failure to consider the Jones factors constitutes an abuse of
discretion. Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96,101 (Utah 1986) and Rehn v. Rehn. 974 P.2d

5

306 (Utah App. 1999). Failure of a Trial court to make findings on all material issues
is reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable
of supporting only a finding in favor of judgment. Haumont v. Haumont 793 P.2d 421,
425 (Utah App. 1990). The findings of fact must show that the Court's judgment or
decree follows logically from, and is supported by the evidence. Smith v. Smith, 726
P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986).
2.

The Trial court abused its discretion by seemingly using income

equalization to determine that Mr. Rigbv should pay alimony, vet the Court did not take
into consideration the debts Mr. Rigbv was ordered to pay.
Standard of Review: This Court will set aside findings of fact only if they are
clearly erroneous. Duncan v. Howard, 918 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah App. 1996). A party
challenging a trial court's findings of fact must "marshal all the evidence supporting the
trial court's findings and then ... show the evidence to be legally insufficient to support
the findings." Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Utah App. 1991). This Court
reviews a trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932,
936 (Utah 1994). Even though the trial court has considerable latitude to adjust
financial and property interest, (Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App.
1988)), an appellate court will reverse for abuse of discretion. Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d
1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993).

6

3.

The trial court abused its discretion in allowing Vernon Ray Riqby only

fifteen percent (15%) of the equity of the marital home based on the Court's findings
of contemptStandard of Review: Trial judges are given "some discretion" in determining
mixed questions of fact and law. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-40 (Utah 1994).
Even though the trial court has considerable latitude to adjust financial and property
interest, (Naranjo v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988)), an appellate
court will reverse for abuse of discretion. Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018,1021 (Utah App.
1993). A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter specific, detailed findings
supporting its financial determinations. Such findings are adequate only if sufficiently
detailed and include subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Id. To permit appellate review of a
property and debt distribution, the distribution must be based upon adequate factual
findings and must be in accordance with the standards set by this states's appellate
courts. Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1994). Failure to make
findings on all material facts is reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear,
uncontroverted and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.
Haumont v. Haumont 793 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App. 1990).
4.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by finding Mr. Rigbv in contempt

of court?

7

Standard of review. This Court will set aside findings of fact only if they are
clearly erroneous. Duncan v. Howard. 918 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah App. 1996). A party
challenging a trial court's findings of fact must "marshal all the evidence supporting the
trial court's findings and then ... show the evidence to be legally insufficient to support
the findings." Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Utah App. 1991). This Court
reviews a trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932,
936 (Utah 1994).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Section 30-3-5(8)(a)(i-vii)
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in
determining alimony:
(i)

(iii)

the financial condition and needs of the recipient
spouse;
the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
the ability of the

(iv)

payor spouse to provide support;

(v)

the length of the marriage.

(vi)

whether the recipient spouse ha custody of
minor children requiring support;

(ii)

8

(vii)

whether the recipient spouse worked in a
business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and

(viii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed
to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by
paying for education received by the payor
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend
school during the marriage.
(b)

The Court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.

(c)

As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of
living, exiting at the time of separation, in determining alimony
in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court sh
all consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and
may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living
that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration,
when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that
existed at the time of the marriage.

(d)

The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to
equalize the parties' respective stands of living.

Utah Code Section 78-2a-3 (2)(h)
(2)(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody,
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity.

9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Facts/ Nature of the Case/ Summary of Argument
During the marriage of Vernon and Loralie Rigby, the parties had purchased a
marital home. The Court found that due to Mr. Rigby's contempt of Court there should
be an 85% -15% split regarding the equity in the marital home, with Mr. Rigby only
being entitled to 15%.
The Court did not make sufficient Findings of Fact to allow the Court to surmise
that Mr. Rigby was in fact in contempt of Court. The Court did not provide an analysis
of how the contempt was decided nor did the Court apply the standard and burden for
a sufficient finding of contempt.
The Court also ordered a disproportionate distribution of the retirement monies
held by the parties. The Court deemed it necessary to award Mrs. Rigby alimony and
did not enter Findings regarding application of the Jones Factors to determine Mrs.
Rigby's needs and Mr. Rigby's ability to pay alimony.
Additionally, Mr. Rigby was ordered to reinstate Mrs. Rigby as a beneficiary
even though it would be costly to do so making a direct impact on Mr. Rigby's ability

10

to pay not only the alimony but also pay the disproportionate share of the marital debt
assigned to Mr. Rigby.
POINT 1
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY NOT
SPECIFICALLY AND THOROUGHLY EXAMINING THE STATUTORY
FACTORS OF ALIMONY FOUND IN UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-5
AND JONES V. JONES. 700 P.2D 1072 (UTAH 1985) REGARDING
LORALIE KEMP RIGBY'S FINANCIAL NEEDS. HER ABILITY TO
PRODUCE INCOME FOR HERSELF AND THE ABILITY OF VERNON
RAY RIGBY TO PROVIDE FOR HER NEEDS? WILLIAMSON V.
WILLIAMSON. 983 P.2D 1003 (UTAH APP. 1999). IN DETERMINING
WHETHER TO AWARD ALIMONY AND IN SETTING THE AMOUNT. A
TRIAL COURT MUST CONSIDER THE NEEDS OF THE RECIPIENT
SPOUSE; THE ABILITY OF THE OBLIGOR SPOUSE TO PROVIDE
SUPPORT: AND THE LENGTH OF THE MARRIAGE. (REHN V REHN.
1999 UTAPP41. 974. P.2D 306).
Should the statutory factors of alimony as set forth in the Utah Code and
Jones be examined by the Court? If these factors were not specifically and
thoroughly examined, is the non-examination an abuse of discretion by the trial
Court?
The Utah Court of Appeals found in the case of Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d
1209,1213 (Utah Court App. 1991) that, "the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to enter specific findings on wife's financial needs and condition, and the

li

pertinent facts in the record are not 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of judgement."'
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that, "Failure to consider the
Jones factors constitutes an abuse of discretion (Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96,
101 (Utah 1986).
The Court found that with regard to the income of the parties Mr. Rigby received
$1,180.00 gross income from Granite School District and $766.00 net from his federal
pension (Record/Findings page 237).
The Court made absolutely no specific finding as to Mr. Rigby's net monthly
income from his employment. Further, the Court made a finding that Mrs. Rigby's gross
monthly income was $1,670.00. The Court made no specific mention or finding
regarding Mrs. Rigby's net monthly income.
It is interesting to note that the Memorandum Decision of the Court (Record,
page 226) is different than the actual Findings and Decree prepared by Mrs. Rigby's
attorney. The new language used the words "needs" and "equalization of income." Of
course, Mr. Rigby was still unrepresented at the time and hampered by his pro se
status.
12

Regardless of the discrepancy between the Memorandum Decision and the
Findings and Decree, still, there was absolutely no specific finding by the Court of Mr.
or Mrs. Rigby's net monthly incomes.
Even though there was no analysis regarding the net monthly incomes of the
parties, the Court then found that Mr. Rigby's monthly income was $300.00 a month
more than Mrs. Rigby's.
The Findings and Decree language that there was "demonstrated need" is
wholly unsupported. The claim that the Court "attempted to equalize the parties'
economic positions" is also unsupported. Even though financial declarations of both
parties were submitted into evidence, the Court in its Findings and Decree made
absolutely no mention of either financial declaration nor was there a determination
made as to whether the Court accepted or relied on the documentation or whether the
Court was relying solely on the oral testimony of both parties.
Even though both parties' financial declarations were discussed during trial the
Court did not analyze or scrutinize whether the debts and obligations claimed by both
parties were accepted or rejected by the Court. Additionally, the monthly expenses

13

claimed by both parties were not analyzed so it is unknowrYwhether the Court accepted
or rejected the claimed monthly expenses stated by both parties.
With there being no findings as to the specific need of Mrs. Rigby or the ability
to pay alimony of Mr. Rigby, the Court's finding that Mrs. Rigby "demonstrated need"
is incorrect and an abuse of discretion.
The correct analysis would have been for the Court to compute the net monthly
incomes of both parties and then conduct the thorough sweeping scrutinizing analysis
of the debts of both parties and the monthly expenses of both parties. The Court could
have then made a proper determination of either the needs based alimony or the
income equalization. Further, the Court in Rasband stated, "Failure by the Court to
consider all of the applicable statutory factors for awarding reasonable alimony,
constitutes an abuse of the trial Court's discretion (Rasband v.Rasband, 752 P. 2d
1331, (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
Regardless, Mr. Rigby testified that he did not have the ability to pay alimony.
The Court should keep in mind that all during the separation and up to the time of trial
which was almost a two year period, the Court was asked to award Mrs. Rigby alimony
on a temporary basis, but the Court declined or reserved the issue.

14

Mrs. Rigby's financial declaration was submitted into evidence. [See Defendant's
Exhibit No.1] She claimed net monthly income of $1,309.80. She also claimed current
monthly expenses of $1,335.00 yet admitted that she did not pay her mother $200.00
rent as she had stated in her financial declaration. This case tracks very closely to the
Bakanowski case. In Bakanowski the, "trial court failed to enter specific findings on the
needs and condition of the recipient spouse, making effective review of the alimony
award impossible, that omission is an abuse of discretion." The trial court entered
findings on both Wife's and Husband's income. However, the trial court made no
factual findings indicating that it considered Wife's financial needs in awarding Wife
$2,000 per month in alimony. Instead, it appears that the trial court simply equalized
the parties' income, based on the length of marriage and Husband's fault. While
consideration of these factors is within the trial court's discretion, entering "adequate
factual findings on all material issues" is mandatory. "In attempting to equalize the
parties' income rather than going through the traditional needs analysis, the trail court
abused its discretion." Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, U 10, 80 P. 3d
153.
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POINT 2
Even though the Finding and Decree indicate that the Court attempted to
"equalize incomes" the Court failed to take into account the specific debt load that was
placed on Mr. Rigby.
It was an abuse of discretion for the Court to not conduct an analysis of the
respective marital debt that each party was ordered to pay and how the marital debt
and subsequent personal debt had such an impact of not making it possible for Mr.
Rigby to pay any alimony.
POINT 3
The Court found that due to Mr. Rigby's several contempts of Court the sanction
of choice was to augment the distribution of equity in the marital home. The Court
entered findings stating that there was approximately $18,000.00-$19,000.00 equity
in the home (See Record at page 236) after the mortgage was paid, commissions,
closing cost, etc. The Court failed to take into account the attorney lien as filed by Mrs.
Rigby's attorney. Exhibit No. 20 was received into evidence by the Court during trial.
16

There should be no sanction of equity interest due to there being no contempt.
Further, the Court ordered Mr. Rigby to cooperate with the signing and closing on the
sale of the home or the Clerk of the Court would be authorized to sign for Mr. Rigby
(See Record at page 235).
Additionally, Mr. Rigby had submitted and the Court received into evidence his
Exhibit No. 20 showing that Mrs. Rigby's attorney had placed an attorney lien on the
property. Mr. Rigby argued that he could not comply with the temporary orders of the
Court and arrange financing of the home due to the attorney lien.
Even though sanction of the unequal distribution was improper, due to the
attorney lien, Mr. Rigby received approximately $2,000.00 as his fifteen (15%) percent
equity, which was even a greater sanction than the Court attempted to impose.
POINT 4
The Court found that Mr. Rigby was in contempt of the Court's various orders
for four different violations. To be found in contempt the Court must make specific
findings that there was a specific Court Order, the individual was aware of the Order
17

of the Court and that they had the ability to comply with the Court Order and that they
willingly did not comply. In addition, caselaw state that, "the trial court must enter
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with respect to each of the substantive
elements. Van Hake v. Thomas, 759 P2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
Very specific findings must be made by the Court for there to be a contempt
finding and Order issued. The various contempt findings of the Court dealt with
information that Mr. Rigby was to turn over to Mrs. Rigby. Mr. Rigby testified that he
did turn over documents and information regarding his 401 (k) account. He testified that
since Mrs. Rigby was keeping all of her retirement funds from her employment that he
thought they had an agreement that he would keep his own retirement.
He testified that he gave the very best accounting to Mrs. Rigby that he could
recall. Mr. Rigby's testimony was outlined in Exhibit No.18 that was received into
evidence. This exhibit is proof that there was not a wilfulness or a refusal by Mr. Rigby
to comply with the Court order. He testified that he provided the information and
knowledge that he had available to him.
18

Mrs. Rigby gave absolutely no testimony that she knew that Mr. Rigby was not
complying or that he had the information and the ability to comply with the various
Orders of the Court.
Finally, the Court made absolutely no finding that there was clear and
convincing burden of proof that was met.
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner requests that the Finding and Decree
previously entered by overturned.

DATED this * 7

day of

j^W^A¥V

2006.

J^CD
David J Friel
Attorney for Appellant
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Addendum

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN 1 3 2005

DAVID A McPHIE (2216)
Attorney at Law
2105 E Murray-Holladay Rd.
Holladay, Utah 84117
(801)278-3700

SALT U K E COUNTY •. / J
W

By.

Pfjputyypjc»rk

AGED

Attorney for Respondent

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-00O00™

DECREE OF DIVORCE

VERNON RAY RIGBY,
Petitioner.
vs.

Civil No. 034903791 DA

LORALIE KEMP RIGBY,
Respondent.

1

THIS MATTER came on for trial in front of the Honorable Judge Robert W. Adkins in

2

his courtroom located at 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Wednesday, the 27th

3

day of April, 2005, at the hour of 1 ;30 o'clock p.m.

4

The Petitioner, Vernon Ray Rigby, appeared in person, pro se, and without counsel. The

5

Court had notified Mr. Rigby at an earlier Pre-trial Conference that having discharged his

6

attorney, he cither needed to obtain the services of a new attorney, or be prepared to represent

7

himself at trial Mr. Rigby indicated at the Pre-trial that he did not intend to obtam a new

8

attorney, and that he intended to represent himself.

'
avid A.
IcPhie
Homey
Law

Judge Robert W, Adkins
Comm: Michael S. Evans
-ooOoo-

_

EMTERED !N REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
DATE k ' 15 * 0 5
de>cree of divorce @J

034903791

JD17172906
RlGBY,LORALlE KEMP

=^f

_-r
/*'

1
2

The Respondent, Loralie Rigby, appeared in person and through her attorney of record,
David A. McPhie.

3

The Court heard opening statements, witnesses were called, examined and cxoss-

4

examined. Items of physical evidence were marked, offered, and admitted into evidep.ee. At the

5

end of trial, the Court took that matter under advisement, trial having concluded at approximately

6

6:00 p.m that same day, April 27th, 2005,

7

The Court later published its decision on this matter via a Memorandum Decision, which

8

is nine (9) pages m length including mailing certificate. A copy of the Memorandum Decision is

9

attached to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as Exhibit A.

10
11

The Court, having previously published its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
which are consistent with said Memorandum Decision, now makes the following;

12

ORDER, JUDGMENT, AND DECREE

r

13

1.

The parties are each awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other, dissolving the

14

bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between them, the same to become final upon the

15

signing and entry hereof.

16
17

2.

The parties have no minor children. Therefore the Court makes no order

concerning:

18

A,

The custody of children;

19

B.

Parent time rights;

ivid A,
cFIuc
'omr.v
Law

2^

^7

1

C

Health insurance for children;

2

D.

An Order to Withhold and deliver, or

3

E.

Day care for children,

4

3.

Each of the parties is awarded the items of personal properly which were in their

5

possession as of the date of this Decree of Divorce as their sole and separate property, free and

6

clear of any claim of the other party. An exception to this award For specific items of personal

7

property may be contained below.

8
9

4,

Each of the parties is awarded the motor vehicle currently in their possession, i.e.

Mrs. Rigby the Oldsinobile and Mr. Rigby the Chevrolet truck. Each party is awarded said

10

vehicle free and clear of any claim of the other, with the requirement that they assume and pay

11

the debt thereon. The parties are ordered to sign the documents necessary to clear title on these

12

vehicles as awarded.

13

5.

With regard to the home and real estate located at 6993 Loch Ness Avenue, West

14

Valley City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,1 the parties are ordered to cooperate fully with the

15

broker with whom the property is currently listed, or if the listing has expired to relist the

16

property, and to cooperate to obtain a buyer and consummate a sale on said real estate at the

17

earliest possible date.

18
19

6.

If Mr. Rigby refuses to sign the listing agreement and/or sale documents for

closing, or any other document necessary to accomplish the sale, the Clerk of the Court is

1

The legal description of said home Ls
LOT 32, GLEM HEATHER NO I SUBDIVISION
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1

ordered, pursuant to Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to sign the documents for him

2

and in his place. The signature of the Clerk of the Court shall be deemed the signature of Mr.

3

Rigby.

4
5
6
7

1.

Upon the sale of the home, Mr. Rigby is awarded fifteen percent (15%) of the sale

proceeds, and Mrs. Rigby is awarded eighty-five percent (85%) of the sale proceeds
8.

Mr. Rigby is ordered to assume and pay the following debts and obligations as his

sole and separate obligation, holding Mrs. Rigby harmless from any liability thereon:

8

A.

The debts and obligations owed to Cyprus Credit Union:

9

B.

Qwest;

10

C.

NCO Financial Services, Inc.;

11

D.

Credit Collection Services;

12

E.

Coalville/Kamas Health Center;

13

F

The Line of Credit with Wells Fargo; and,

14

G.

Any and all indebtedness he has incurred since the date of the parties'

15
]6

separation,
9.

Mrs, Rigby is ordered to assume and pa} as her sole and separate debt and

17

obligation the following debts and obligations, holding Mr. Rigby harmless from any liability

18

thereon:

19

A.

The Wells Fargo Visa account, and,

20

B.

Any and all indebtedness that she has incurred since the date of the panics7

21

separation.
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1

10.

Each of the parties is ordered to pay one half of the R,C. Willey debt

2

11.

Mr. Rigby is ordered to pay Mrs. Rigby alimony in the amount of $ 125.00 per

3

month beginning May 1st, 2005. Said alimony shall continue until the occurrence of the first of

4

the following events:

5

A.

Mrs. Ri gby rcmarries;

6

B,

Mrs. Rigby cohabitatcs as defined in Utah Law;

7

C.

Mrs. Rigby dies;

8

D.

Mr, Rigby dies;

9

E.

A period of time post-decree not to exceed the length of the marriage; or

10

F.

Further order of the Court.

11

Mrs, Rigby is awarded Mr. Rigby's monthly Survivor Annuity associated with

12

Mr. Rigby'$ Federal retirement. Payments to Mrs, Rigby are to commence upon Mr. Rigby\s

13

death, and be in the maximum amount allowed by law. Mr. Rigby is ordered to take the steps

]4

necessary to establish or re-establish Mrs. Rigby as the beneficiajy of .said Survivor Annuity and

15

provide evidence that said action has taken place. In the event that Mr. Rigby re-marries, the

]6

Courl finds thai a subsequent spouse may share this Survivor Annuity as provided for by Federal

17

Law.

18

13,

Mrs Rigby is awarded all of the retirement benefits she accumulated from her

19

employment with First Security Bank and Wells Fargo bank as her sole and separate property,

20

free and clear of any claim of Mr. Rigby.

21
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12.

11

Each of the parlies shall be al lowed to designate the beneficiary of his or her life

5

1

insurance policy, as any person they may choose. Each of the parties is awarded the ownership

2

oTtheir life insurance policy,

3

15.

Mr. Rigby is ordered to take the steps necessary to reinstate Mrs Rigby on his

4

health insurance with the federal government, if she so elects. If Mrs, Rigby elects to do so. Mi.

5

Rigby shall cooperate to accomplish the same at the earliest possible date, with the condition that

6

Mrs. Rigby pay the costs of the coverage,

7
8

16.

accounting as to the contents of his Discover 401 (k).

9
10

17,

18,

Mr. Rigby is held in contempt for his failure to provide a written accounting

concerning his sale arid/or other distribution of personal property.

13
14

Mr. Rigby is held m contempt for his failure to provide a written accounting

concerning cash value of his MetLife policy,

U
12

Mr. Rigby is hereby held in contempt for his failure to provide adequate

19.

Mr. Rigby is held in contempt for his failure to reinstate Mrs. Rigby on his

Federal health insurance.

15

20.

As a sanction for said contempt and for other reasons as outlined in the Court's

16

Findings, the Court divides the equity in the parlies'1 home on Loch Ness Avenue eighty-five

17

percent (85%) for the Respondent LoraUe Kemp Rigby, and fifteen percent (15%) for the

18

Petitioner Vernon Ray Rigby.

19
20

21,

The Court orders each of Lhe parlies to pay their own costs of court and attorney's

fees.
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1

DATED this

/>>

day of

.,2005.

X j ^4<&~
BY THE COURT-

2

/
3
4

MAILING CERTIFICATE

5
6
7

I hereby certify that T mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to
the following, postage prepaid this ^ > f1^Day of
\jj\
,2005
*%

8
9
10

Vernon R. Rigby
6993 Loch Ness Avenue
West Valley City, Utah 84128

cW4tottk
12

]3

Sally Wtchhigs
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